Strongcertificatebindingenforcement Fix Now

Why you need to move from "Audit" to "Enforced" to stop Kerberos relay attacks.

If successful, the attacker requests a certificate for the DC. Once they possess the DC's certificate, they can authenticate to the domain as the Domain Controller, granting them complete control over the forest (DCSync, etc.). strongcertificatebindingenforcement

If the StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement is set to strict mode (2), and an attacker attempts to relay a certificate where the UPN in the certificate does not match the userPrincipalName attribute of the target account (or the mapping is ambiguous), the KDC will reject the authentication request with a KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOT_TRUSTED or similar error. Why you need to move from "Audit" to

: Allows authentication for certificates that are not strongly mapped but logs a warning (Event ID 39). : Once your templates are updated, trigger a

: Modify your Windows Enterprise CA templates to include the new SID extension.

: Once your templates are updated, trigger a re-enrollment for all active users and devices. Summary of Risks

Here is your 3-step migration plan: