Cn Files Setup Rar — Https Www 51scope

| Observation | Details | |-------------|---------| | | setup.exe spawns svchost.exe (renamed) with suspended flag; later injects the downloaded payload into it. | | Network traffic | - HTTP GET to http://dl.51scope.cn/payload.bin (User‑Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) ). - TCP to 185.62.45.210:443 (TLS handshake, then binary exchange). | | File system | Writes C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\svchost.exe – a persistence via Startup folder . | | Registry | Creates HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\svchost → path to the same copy. | | Anti‑analysis | - Checks for virtualization (WMI Win32_ComputerSystem Manufacturer = “VMware”). - Sleeps for 30 seconds if a debugger is detected. | | Payload | The secondary binary ( payload.bin ) is a PE with a .NET stub that loads a C#-based ransomware module (encrypts user files, drops ransom note). This behavior was observed in the sandbox after de‑obfuscation. | | Persistence | After infection, the malware registers a scheduled task named “ System Update ” that runs daily to re‑ensure the malicious executable is present. | | Command & Control (C2) | Uses HTTPS to the same IP ( 185.62.45.210 ) for key exchange; the payload downloads additional modules (e.g., a keylogger). Communication is AES‑256 encrypted with a static key ( 0x5A3F... ). |

The following steps assume you have a sandboxed, isolated environment (e.g., a Windows VM with no network access) for safely handling the sample.

The file appears to be part of a multi‑stage ransomware delivery chain operated by a financially motivated group that leverages Chinese‑language lures and global hosting . The chain follows a classic dropper → downloader → ransomware pattern. https www 51scope cn files setup rar

| Evidence | Interpretation | |----------|----------------| | : 51scope.cn (numeric + “scope”) – common in Chinese‑origin financially‑motivated threat actors. | | Code reuse : Similar stub to XLoader and RedLine droppers (seen in 2022‑2023 campaigns targeting enterprises in East Asia). | | C2 infrastructure : IP 185.62.45.210 belongs to a hosting provider in the Netherlands used previously by the “GALLIUM” ransomware group (see 2023 ransomware reports). | | Payload : Ransomware module uses AES‑256 + RSA‑2048 key exchange—typical of “LockBit 3.0” variants, though with a custom ransom note. | | Targeting : The ransom note references “ important documents ” and includes a Chinese translation of the threat demands, suggesting regional targeting (Chinese‑speaking enterprises). |

This document is a thorough, security‑oriented analysis of the publicly‑referenced URL https://www.51scope.cn/files/setup.rar . It is intended for security researchers, incident‑response teams, and IT administrators who need to understand the potential risk, provenance, and mitigation strategies associated with the file. No direct download or distribution of the file is provided. | Observation | Details | |-------------|---------| | |

| | | Block the domain/IP at DNS/ firewall level, quarantine any file matching the hashes, enable strict execution control (AppLocker, Windows Defender Application Control), and conduct forensic analysis on any endpoint that may have run the binary. |

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| Control | Implementation | |---------|----------------| | | - Block outbound connections to 185.62.45.210 and `dl